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COMMENTS
THE OIL AND GAS INSTALLMENT BONUS AND
CAPITAL GAINS TREATMENT - A CRITIQUE
Rice M. Tilley Jr.
Obtaining capital gains through the use of an oil and gas install-
ment bonus involves a two step transaction, viz., the recipient of a
bonus arranges for its payment in installments and then assigns this
right to the intallment payments treating the proceeds received as a
gain on the sale of a capital asset. Each step in the transaction will
first be discussed separately and then in relationship to each other.
I. PAYMENT OF THE BONUS IN INSTALLMENTS
When an oil and gas lease is granted in exchange for both a cash
bonus and a retained royalty, the payment of the bonus by the
lessee constitutes a capital investment made for the acquisition of
an economic interest in a mineral deposit and is recoverable through
the higher of cost or percentage depletion. To the lessor the bonus
represents advance royalty and is thus ordinary income in the year
of receipt subject to the higher of cost or percentage depletion!
The receipt by a lessor of a cash bonus has always assured him
at the time of the execution of the lease of an economic benefit
which would otherwise not have been available until actual produc-
tion in paying quantities resulted in royalty payments. However,
this lump sum bonus payment ordinarily has not been satisfactory
because it was wholly taxed in that year at ordinary income tax
rates. As a result, it became popular to arrange for the payment of
the bonus in deferred annual installments with each payment being
subject to a depletion deduction' in the year received. Such pay-
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3 (a) (3) (1960).
aTreas. Reg. § 1.612-3 (a), (d) (1960). These same principles apply to the analogous
sublease situation in which the owner of a working interest transfers it but retains an
overriding royalty. For purposes of clarity in terminology, the term "lessor" will denote
any assignor of a lease and the term "lessee" will indicate the assignee.
3 These installments are payable in any event and cannot be avoided by drilling or by
a surrender of the lease. Fiske, Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Transactions § 2.06
(1960). Just as is the case with a normal lump sum bonus, if the lease is abandoned at
some subsequent time with no drilling, the lessor must report as income an amount equiva-
lent to the depletion which was previously allowed or allowable on the prior bonus in-
stallments received. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3 (a) (2) (1960). Of course, if any of the in-
stallment payments are received after the abandonment, no depletion deductions may be
taken since they are only conditional allowances granted in anticipation of production from
the property, and relinquishment of the lease terminates any such anticipation. Douglas v.
Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
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ments were treated as advance royalties paid in addition to the
royalties dependent upon production since their essential character
was fixed at origin and was not changed by deferment." This had
the obvious advantage of spreading the lessor's bonus over several
taxing periods. On the other hand the lessee was unaffected because
he could only capitalize the bonus as part of the leasehold cost re-
gardless of whether it was payable in a lump sum or in installments.!
Certainly there was no legal reason why bonus payments could not
continue to be made after income began to accrue by means of the
royalty stemming from a share of actual production. What such a
situation amounted to was that the owner of the economic interest
represented by the royalty was receiving income out of current or
anticipated production equal to his fractional interest in production
plus the amount of the installment payment.!
The prerequisite to the lessor's being allowed to report as income
only the bonus installment payment received each year was that
the obligation of the lessee to make the installment payments had
to be secured only by an executory contract with no notes, bonds
or other evidences of indebtedness being given.! Consequently, the
contract would have no fair market value and no tax liability could
arise until an actual payment was made.'
This result clearly followed so far as cash basis taxpayers were
concerned.9 Nothing taxable was actually received because all that
was transferred to the lessor was an executory contract which, it
was settled, had no fair market value." Nothing was constructively
received because the lessor had no right to demand the payments
until they became due each year."
41 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 10 (1951).
Breeding & Burton, Income Taxation of Oil and Gas Production § 4.08 (rev. ed.
1961).
'See Kent, Tax Problems Affecting Lessors and Royalty Owners, Southwestern Legal
Foundation First Inst. on Oil and Gas L. & Tax. 355, 393 (1949).
'This is to be distinguished from § 453, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, which specifically
allows the use of the installment method, since § 453 applies only to sales, and an oil and
gas lease is not a sale for federal taxation purposes. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103
(1932); see Kent, op. cit. supra note 6.
"There was a failure to act pursuant to this technique in Harry Leland Barnsley, 31
T.C. 1260 (1959). Accordingly, since the lessor received a right to installment bonus
payments represented by negotiable notes, it was held that the notes were the equivalent
of cash, and therefore the full fair market value of the lease was taxable to the lessor as
ordinary depletable income in the year of the execution of the lease.
'The Regulations provide that a cash basis taxpayer is taxable only for items of income
which are actually or constructively received within the tax year. Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1957).
'0 Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941); R. B. Cowden, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1148 (1950). See also Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929).
" The Regulations provide that income will be constructively received by the taxpayer
in the year in which it is credited to his account or set apart for him so that he may
draw upon it at any time. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1957).
[Vol. 15
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As might be expected, the problem became more difficult when
accrual basis taxpayers entered the picture." Nevertheless, an ac-
crual basis taxpayer in C. W. Titus1" was allowed to report the in-
stallment bonus payments when they were actually received. This
conclusion was based on the fact that the executory contract indi-
cated merely a conditional or contingent liability since nothing in
the contract itself provided when, if ever, the assignee would become
bound to make the payments. Accordingly, the assignor had nothing
more than an account receivable. Although the Titus case has been
criticized, its holding can probably be justified on the basis of the
particular fact situation involved, viz., the inconclusive terminology
in the contract constituted a sufficient contingency to prevent the
obligation from becoming fixed.
That the payment to be received is a true installment bonus may
for purposes of this Comment be assumed; however, care should be
taken to prevent a possible contention by the Commissioner that
it is actually a delay rental. This is important because a lessor must
report delay rentals as ordinary income not subject to depletion.1"
Furthermore, the lessee will undoubtedly claim that any question-
able payment is a delay rental, because the Revenue Service has taken
the position that delay rentals are not materially different from
carrying charges on non-productive property. Thus, unlike bonus
payments, the lessee has an option either to expense" or to capital-
ize" them. However, as long as the lessee is committed to make
annual payments and cannot avoid the payments by abandoning the
lease, commencing drilling operations, or obtaining production from
the property, the payments will be regarded as a lease bonus payable
in installments and not as a delay rental. Moreover, any payment
which continues a lease in force for more than one year will proba-
bly be treated as being in the nature of a bonus. 9 A slightly dif-
ferent problem arises where payments are made to a lessor to defer
production from a lease after a well has been drilled and found to
" The Regulations provide: "Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be
included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to
receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1) (ii) (1957).
"333 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
14 See Breeding & Burton, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 4.08.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c)(2) (1960).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 162 (a) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3 (c) (2) (1960).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 266; Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b) (1) (i) (1959).
"Bennett v. Scofield, 170 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1948). See Ervin, The Bonuses, Mini-
mum Royalties and Delay Rentals, Southwestern Legal Foundation Fifth Inst. on Oil and
Gas L. & Tax. 529, 544 (1954).
19Houston Farms Dev. Co. v. United States, 131 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1942). See Judge,
Tax Considerations of the Oil and Royalty Owner, 31 Taxes 828, 832 (1953).
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be productive. "Shut-in" payments which are not recoverable from
future production and which must be paid to prevent a termina-
tion or forfeiture of the lease are treated as delay rentals and not
entitled to a depletion deduction. A recent decision has even taken
this position in a situation where the lease continued whether or not
the payment was made and even though the right to extract the
minerals remained with the lessee."
II. CAPITAL GAINS TREATMENT OF THE PROCEEDS RECEIVED
FROM THE ASSIGNMENT OF A RIGHT TO
INSTALLMENT BONUS PAYMENTS
Assuming that a taxpayer-lessor successfully arranged for the
payment of installment bonus payments over a period of years and
was thus subject to taxation only in the year a payment was actually
received, the receipt of the amount of the bonus was effectively
spread over a period of several years. Nevertheless, there was still
a failure to obtain the substantially more advantageous capital gains
treatment. The obvious solution to this problem was for the lessor
to sell his right to receive the installment payments and, if he had
owned the leased land for six months, treat the amount received as
proceeds from the sale of a capital asset.
The landmark case dealing with this tax minimization technique
was Alice G. K. Kleberg" (hereinafter referred to as the first Kleberg
case). Here, the taxpayer-lessors, who were on the cash basis, were
the owners of a fractional interest in the mineral rights of a sub-
stantial land acreage in Texas. In 1933 the entire tract was leased
by the owners, including the taxpayers, to a large oil company for
installment bonus payments extending over a period of twenty
years and a V8 royalty interest in all oil and gas produced. In the
same year the taxpayers assigned their portion of the right to receive
these installment payments to the other owner of the property, the
King estate, for cash, payable one-half in 1933 and the other half
in 1934. The reason for the split payments was that the King estate
was unable to pay the entire lump sum in 1933. The Commissioner
contended that the taxpayers had merely sold their right to receive
future installment payments and were thus simply anticipating
ordinary income in 1933 in the amount of both payments. In adopt-
ing the taxpayer's position the court held that there had been a
sale of a capital asset, i.e., a royalty interest, since a bonus is an
advance royalty. However, the court found that, other than the
20 Johnson v. Phinney, 287 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1961).
2143 B.T.A. 277 (1941).
[Vol. 1 5
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1933 payment itself, nothing was received in that year except a
contractual promise to pay in 1934 an equal amount which was
not evidenced by any note, bond, or other instrument of indebted-
ness. Accordingly, the court cited the Titus" case and concluded
that the promise to make the 1934 payment had no fair market
value in 1933 and therefore the taxpayers were taxable only in 1933
to the extent of the actual payment received in that year." The
court then went on to hold that the taxpayers were not entitled to
any depletion deduction on the payments received by them since
they had sold their economic interest to the purchaser who then
became the only one entitled to the depletion deduction. However,
the taxpayers were, of course, allowed to recover their cost basis in
computing gain on the transaction.
A subsequent related case, Alice G. K. Kleberg' (which was a
continuation of the first Kleberg case and will be hereinafter referred
to as the second Kleberg case), added one important additional point:
the holding period (for purposes of capital gains taxation) of the
capital asset transferred by the Klebergs began at the time when the
taxpayers first acquired their interest in the property rather than,
as the Commissioner had contended, at the time taxpayers sold their
right to receive the installment payments. After first stating that oil
and gas in place in Texas are a part of the realty, susceptible of
ownership and conveyance, the court then reasoned that "the sale
of the right to receive the rents from the [taxpayer's] interest in
the ... lease to the King estate did not create any new right to the
minerals in the [taxpayer] . . .it merely changed the form in which
the proceeds from the sale of the original mineral rights were to be
received.""'
It is interesting to note that the Revenue Service acquiesced in
both the first"6 and second' Kleberg cases but subsequently with-
drew these and substituted non-acquiescences in the early 1950's.21
This "sale" language was again emphasized in a more recent case,
R. B. Cowden"' (hereinafter referred to as the first Cowden case).
2233 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
23 This conclusion was based on the relevant statutory language which stated that:
"The amount realized from the sale . . . of property shall be the sum of any money
received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received." (Em-
phasis added.) Revenue Act of 1932, ch 209, § 111(b), 47 Stat. 196.
242 T.C. 1024 (1943).
25Id. at 1031.26
Acq., 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 6.
27 Acq., 1944 Cum. Bull. 16.
28Acq. withdrawn and non-acq. substituted, 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 5 (first Kleberg case);
acq.2withdrawn and non-acq. substituted, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 5 (second Kleberg case).
99 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1148 (1950), remanded on stipulation, 202 F.2d 748 (5th
Cir. 1953). Apparently a dollar compromise of the deficiencies was reached.
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In this case the lessors were also cash basis taxpayers residing in Texas.
Leases were executed with separate supplementary agreements pro-
viding for unconditional installment bonus payments on specific
future dates. On the day following the execution of the leases, the
lessors assigned the bonus agreements without recourse to several
banks. When the lessors reported the proceeds of the sales in the year
of the assignment as proceeds from the sales of capital assets held
for more than six months (since the land had been acquired several
years previously), the Commissioner contended that the deferred
payments were taxable income in the year the property was leased.
The court relied on the first Kleberg case to hold that even though
the promises to make future installment payments were uncon-
ditional, since they were not evidenced by notes, bonds, or other
evidences of indebtedness, the contractual promises had no fair
market value when executed. Therefore, the lessors received no
taxable income until the payments were actually made. The court
then held that since oil and gas in Texas are part of the realty,
capable of conveyance, the execution of the lease by the lessors
actually constituted a sale of portions of their realty with the con-
sideration being the right to receive installment bonus payments.
Thus, the sale of the right to the installment bonus payments merely
changed the form of the proceeds realized from the original sale
of the realty, ° i.e., changed it from ordinary income to gain on
the sale of a capital asset.
Strong support can be found for the position that the reasoning
used by the court, in reaching its conclusion that capital gains
treatment will apply when rights to installment bonus payments
are assigned, was based on a legal fallacy."5 It is true as the court
stated that in Texas the execution of an oil and gas lease constitutes
the conveyance of realty. But it is equally true that local law does
not control the timing and tax result so far as federal taxing statutes
are concerned." It would thus appear that the court in the second
Kleberg and first Cowden cases applied the "'sale" language of the
0 The court paraphrased that portion of the second Kleberg case which was quoted
supra in the discussion of that case. 9 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. at 1150.
"See 2 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 219 (1953).
aa See e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932), where the Court answered
the contention of a Texas lessor-taxpayer that capital gains treatment should be given to
a bonus received upon the execution of an oil and gas lease by stating that:
For the purpose of applying this section to the particular payments now
under consideration, the Act of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective
of any particular characterization of the payments in the local law. . . . The
state law creates legal interests but the federal statute determines when and
how they shall be taxed. We examine the Texas law only for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the leases conform to the standard which the taxing
statute prescribes for giving the favored treatment to capital gains.
[Vol. 15
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first Kleberg case (which was therein applied only to the sale of a
royalty interest, i.e., installment bonus payments a ) too liberally
when discussing the tax consequences of a taxpayer-lessor's execu-
tion of an oil and gas lease. Therefore, to the extent the first Cowden
case views an oil and gas lease as an instrument of sale and applies
capital gains treatment to the proceeds received for the assignment
of the right to future bonus installments, it appears to be at variance
with the legal principles established by the Supreme Court and
recognized by the Bureau and independent practitioners for many
years. Accordingly, it is submitted that the application of these long
accepted legal principles to the transaction here in question would
completely nullify the basis upon which the courts in the second
Kleberg case and in the first Cowden case derived the conclusion
that capital gains treatment would be accorded the assignment of
rights to future bonus installment payments.
The cases dealt with under this heading have concerned only cash
basis taxpayers. However, a strong argument may be made for the
proposition that insofar as the Kleberg and Cowden cases were valid,
accrual basis taxpayers could also plan their leasing and subleasing
transactions in a manner which would result in capital gains treat-
ment of the proceeds received from assigned rights to installment
payments. It will be remembered that the court in the first Kleberg
case refused to consider the deferred payments as income realized
upon the execution of the lease because, as the court pointed out, a
promise to pay evidenced only by a contract, unsupported by notes,
bonds or other evidences of indebtedness, has no fair market value.
In so stating, the court made reference to the Titus4 case which dealt
with an accrual basis taxpayer and which held that a taxpayer's
accounting method was not determinative of whether a contract had
a fair market value." Consequently, it appears that accrual basis
taxpayers should be entitled to the same capital gains treatment as
the cash basis taxpayers involved in the Kleberg and Cowden cases.
The first Kleberg case also dealt with a particular transaction
343 B.T.A. at 288:
It is our opinion that the respondent is correct in his contention that the
transaction between petitioners and the representatives of the King estate
was a sale. . . . The thing the absolute or general property in which was
transferred from petitioners to the King estate was petitioners' right to re-
ceive 20 annual rental payments. . . . The price in money paid or promised
was . . . cash paid upon the execution of the agreement, and a promise
to pay . . . cash [in the following year]. Thus all the elements of a sale
are present.
3433 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
s5 Id. at 929: "We now think that we were in error in holding that the fact that the
taxpayer kept its books on the accrual method of accounting was determinative of the
issue . .. ."
1961]
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which is quite similar to those which have just been discussed, but
which must be distinguished from them. One of the two taxpayer-
lessors involved in the Kleberg cases had received a separate tract
of land which was her separate property. She leased this land also
and received as consideration the usual 8 royalty and an agreement
by the lessee to pay her a stated amount in two installments, this
amount being calculated on the basis of certain annual payments
for twenty years discounted at their present value. The court held "'
that the exchange with the lessee of the twenty annual installment
payments for a lump sum payment in the year of the exchange plus
another lump sum in the following year did not constitute a sale.
Further, the two lump sum payments were in the nature of a bonus
and the lessor was thus entitled to a depletion deduction on the
amount of each of the two payments when received. This transaction
was essentially different from the situation in the first Kleberg case
which has been previously discussed. There, a sale resulting in capital
gains treatment was effected by the assignment to a third party of
the right to installment bonus payments in exchange for two lump
sum payments to be made in the year of the exchange and in the
following year. Here, these two steps were shortened into one which
resulted in a different tax consequence. Thus, the same individual
who was obligated to make the installment payment was the one
who exchanged them for the two lump sum payments. This, rather
than effecting a sale (and capital gains treatment), merely brought
about an acceleration of the payment of the bonus."
III. THE SECOND COWDEN CASE
Prior to 1959 there had been implicit faith in the use of the in-
stallment bonus as a safe and effective method of preventing the
concentration of income in one tax year. But there was substantially
less confidence on the part of tax planners in regard to the sale of
rights to receive future bonus installments in order to obtain capital
gains treatment of the proceeds received. Even though the Kleberg
and first Cowden cases favored the taxpayer, the Internal Revenue
Service continued to maintain its adverse position."
Accordingly, there was an understandable sense of shock on the
part of those accustomed to utilizing the installment bonus as a tax
minimization technique when the Tax Court in Frank Cowden,
3643 B.T.A. 277 (1941).
" See Kent, op. cit. supra note 6, at 394.
" This position became even more formidable after the decision in Commissioner v.
P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). See text accompanying note 82 infra.
[Vol. 15
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Sr." (hereinafter referred to as the second Cowden case) attacked,
not the use of the installment bonus as a capital gain device, but
the installment bonus itself.
A. The Tax Court Decision
In the unique facts of this case, a taxpayer-lessor on the cash
basis had contracted with an oil company for the sale of oil and gas
leases. Part of the consideration for the leases was the execution by
the oil company of unsecured non-negotiable agreements to pay
the lease bonus in three installments. The oil company was willing
and able to pay the bonus immediately but acquiesced in the lessor's
demand for a deferment of the bonus payments. The bank to whom
the lessor assigned the installment payment rights had obtained an
opinion from its counsel that the obligations represented thereby
were bankable. Although such transactions were not considered
commonplace, the bank had, over several years, acquired a number
of other such obligations in like manner. Consequently, the bank
was willing to purchase the agreements at a nominal discount.
Further, even the lessor believed that the agreement had a fair market
value. Prior to the actual payment of each installment the lessor
would sell the contract to the bank for cash. The lessor relied on
the usual argument that his right to receive future bonus payments
had no fair market value and therefore could not result in the
realization of taxable income to him upon the execution of the
agreement. Nevertheless, the court held that the installment bonus
contract had a fair market value and was thus taxable as gross in-
come in the year in which the contract was made. The court pointed
out that, "we are convinced from the particular facts of this case
that ...here the bonus payments were not only readily but im-
mediately convertible to and were the equivalent of cash and for
that reason had a fair market value in their face amounts. This
value, less depletion allowances, represents ordinary income to the
[lessor] upon the date of execution and delivery of the leases ....
(Emphasis added.)
Unfortunately, it is difficult to discern the true basis for the Tax
Court's decision. The dissent criticized the majority view on the
grounds that it dangerously extended the doctrine of constructive
receipt, 41 however, the Tax Court opinion also appears to have relied
to some extent on the "equivalent of cash" concept.
3932 T.C. 853 (1959); noted, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 1237 (1959); 58 Mich. L. Rev.
480 (1960).J 32 T.C. at 858, 859.
4'Id. at 861:
Thus, the result reached by the majority can only be based upon the pro-
1961]
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1. The Constructive Receipt Argument
Constructive receipt is a fiction used to determine when certain
income is realized.42 In essence, this doctrine treats income which is
unqualifiedly available to a cash method taxpayer as though it had
been received at the time it became available." Emphasis had been
placed on the extent to which the taxpayer had unfettered com-
mand44 over the funds, whether the transaction was negotiated at
arm's length,4' and whether the taxpayer turned his back on income
to which he had a present legal right. The doctrine, however, has
not been applied in cases (such as the second Cowden case) where
the taxpayer did not have an existing right to the money when the
cash offer was made. With these factors in mind, it appears un-
likely that the Tax Court decision in the second Cowden case was
based on constructive receipt. The court apparently recognized
that the lessor had no existing right to the installment bonus pay-
ments at the time of the execution of the lease because it did not
even mention the doctrine of constructive receipt. Of those factors
mentioned by the majority as being decisive in framing their de-
cision,4 only one-that the lessor refused the lessee's continual offer
position that [the oil company] would have as willingly paid the bonuses in
cash on execution of the lease and therefore [this] cash basis [taxpayer was]
in constructive receipt of the cash. . . In my view this is a far reaching
and dangerous extension of the doctrine of constructive receipt.
4 The Regulations provide: "Generally, under the cash receipts and disbursements
method in the computation of taxable income, all items which constitute gross income
(whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are to be included for the taxable
year in which actually or constructively received." (Emphasis added.) Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1 (c) (1) (a) (1957).
4aE.g., Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948).
4 "The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to
enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income whether he sees fit to enjoy
it or not." Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
4aE.g., Glenn v. Penn, 250 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1958); Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809
(1947).
"'E.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 29 B.T.A. 63 (1933) (holder of promissory note re-
fused to accept early payment when maker had a right to pay before the due date).
" E.g., Richards' Estate v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1945); J. D. Amend,
13 T.C. 178 (1949). These cases are based on reasoning exemplified by Treas. Reg. 5
1.451-2(a) (1957) which provides:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is con-
structively received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited
to his account or set apart for him so that he may draw upon it at any time.
However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of
its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.
4' The factors were:
1) The lessor believed that the agreement had a fair market value.
2) The bank was willing to purchase the agreements at a nominal discount.
3) The bank considered the rights to be bankable and to represent direct obligations
of the payor.
4) The bank generally dealt in such contracts where it was satisfied with the financial
responsibility of the payor and looked solely to it for payment without recourse to the lessor.
5) The oil company lessee was willing to pay the face amount of the obligations
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to make immediate payment of the obligations-indicates that the
doctrine of constructive receipt could have been applicable.
From a more conceptual perspective, the constructive receipt
doctrine presupposes a situation in which an obligation is due and
payable, and for payment thereof the "debtor" has made funds
available which are refused by the "creditor."4 Since this is entirely
different from the situation in which the debtor is willing and able
to repay the debt, it would be logical to surmise that the Tax Court
did not reach its conclusion on grounds of constructive receipt be-
cause of the lack of an immediate obligation to pay.
Another interesting consideration is the fact that, if the Tax
Court did rely on constructive receipt, its decision is in direct con-
flict with a recent Revenue Ruling, 0 which was published after the
decision was announced in the second Cowden case. The Ruling
indicated that the doctrine of constructive receipt would not be used
to tax a contract providing for deferred payments, and further
stated without qualification that the income tax statutes "cannot
be administered by speculating whether the payor would have been
willing to agree to an earlier payment.""
A further ground for criticism may be based on the fact that the
doctrine of constructive receipt is applicable only to cash basis
taxpayers." In this connection it is appropriate to note the statement
by the Tax Court that:
The fact that [the lessor] reported [his] taxable income on the cash
basis of accounting is of no consequence here for no matter on what
basis income is reported where, as here, an immediate payment in money
or its equivalent is made a consideration for the execution of a lease,
that payment constitutes taxable income under any accounting and
reporting method." (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, if the Tax Court's conclusion was reached without regard
for the accounting and reporting method used by the taxpayer-
lessor, then that conclusion could not have been grounded on the
doctrine of constructive receipt which is applicable only to cash
basis taxpayers.
immediately and at all times prior to the due dates and the only reason this was not done
was due to the lessor's refusal to receive such payments.
49See 9 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 122, 126 (1960).
s Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 5, at 174. This ruling clearly demon-
strates that the Service will not apply the doctrine of constructive receipt to unfunded
contracts even in the absence of any provisions in the contract that condition the tax-
payer's right to the deferred compensation.
51 Ibid.
5' Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 158 (1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 734
(9th Cir. 1951); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1957).
53 32 T.C. at 859.
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It must be pointed out that if the courts were to view this decision
as the dissent apparently did, (viz., as the finding of constructive
receipt based on the fact that the taxpayer insisted on the deferred
payment), it could be extended to make taxable in the year of the
making of the contract all income to be received through the use
of deferred payment contracts which are now widely used by
authors, entertainers, and business executives as a technique for
spreading income over several taxable years. Such an extension
would seem wholly unwarranted in view of the fact that, since such
contracts are usually arm's length transactions, a serious departure
from present tax policy in this field would result. Further, such a
finding could constitute a precedent for the finding of constructive
receipt even in a situation where a land vendor desiring periodic
payments was unfortunate enough to receive a cash offer. Surely,
requiring tax liability to depend solely upon whether the taxpayer
had sufficient foresight to warn the promisor not to mention cash
is a tenuous distinction which borders on the ridiculous.
Finally, if it be assumed that the Tax Court relied upon the fact
that the lessee would have paid the bonuses in cash just as willingly
at the time of execution of the lease, the decision conflicts with in-
come tax fundamentals. A taxpayer should be taxed on the basis of
the transaction into which he actually entered. As the dissent pointed
out, "It has been axiomatic that a taxpayer is free to cast his transac-
tions in any manner he may choose, and the tax consequences of
such transactions are to be based on what he did, not what he could
or might have done, the only qualification being that he must in
fact have done what he claims, not merely appear to have done so.
''
2. The Equivalent of Cash Argument
Although a cash basis taxpayer who has a right to receive benefits
in the future from an unfunded contract may not, under the doctrine
of constructive receipt, realize income at the time the contract is
made, he may be said to realize income on the contract by applying
the cash equivalent doctrine. Unlike constructive receipt, which
determines when certain income is realized, cash equivalent deals
with one aspect of the general problem of what non-cash benefits
constitute income, and any contract rights with a fair market value
are treated like property and taxed when received. Under the
equivalent of cash method, the taxpayer is taxed on the income
received in cash or its equivalent within the taxable year.5 For
54 Id. at 861.
"See John B. Atkins, 9 B.T.A. 140, 150 (1927), aff'd, 36 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1929)
("in the case of one reporting income on the receipts and disbursements basis only cash
or its equivalent constitutes income."); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 61, 451.
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example, a negotiable note received by a cash basis taxpayer in
payment of an obligation is the equivalent of cash " and the tax-
payer realizes income to the extent of the fair market value57 of
the note when he receives it. However, realization of income through
the application of the cash equivalent doctrine is not limited to
situations where the taxpayer actually receives cash or a negotiable
note, for the doctrine has been extended to include any economic
beneft s derived by the taxpayer.
Of those factors listed by the majority opinion as being determina-
tive of the decision reached,"0 all but one indicate that the court's
decision was based wholly on this economic benefit aspect of the
equivalent of cash doctrine. But here, the property interest received
by the taxpayer was only an unsecured executory contract for
future payments, and the courts had never before held that the
economic benefit concept could be extended to such unfunded
contractual arrangements."' Accordingly, the value of an unfunded
contract to receive benefits in the future has never been taxed at
the time the contract was made." The basis for this has been that, as
a matter of law, an unfunded contract to receive benefits in the
future can have no fair market value." Only where the right to
" Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cherokee
Motor Coach Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1943); Harry Leland Barns-
ley, 31 T.C. 1260 (1959). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1959).
" The interest rate and the solvency of the parties liable on the note will largely deter-
mine the fair market value. Paul M. Potter, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 114 (1946).
5 E.g., Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940).59 See Comment, 1960 Duke L.J. 436.
60 See note 48 supra.
.' The most emphatic statement to this effect was rendered by Judge Learned Hand in
Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929):
If a company sells out its plant for a negotiable bond issue payable in the
future, the profit may be determined by the present market value of the
bonds. But if land or a chattel is sold, and title passes merely upon a promise
to pay money at some future date, to speak of the promise as property ex-
changed for the title appears to us a strained use of language when calculat-
ing profits under the income tax . . . . [I]t is absurd to speak of a promise
to pay a sum in the future as having a "market value," fair or unfair. Such
rights are sold, if at all, only by seeking out a purchaser and higgling with
him on the basis of the particular transaction.
See also United States v. Christine Oil & Gas Co., 269 Fed. 458 (1920); C. Florian
Zittel, 12 B.T.A. 675 (1928); Branscomb, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Taxa-
tion, Southwestern Legal Foundation Eleventh Inst. on Oil and Gas L. & Tax. 615, 652
(1960).
62 C. W. Titus, 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936) (deferred payment contract for the sale of oil
and gas leases held not to have a fair market value); J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903
(1936) (noncommercial annuity contract held not to have a fair market value); Charles
C. Ruprecht, 16 B.T.A. 919 (1929), aff'd, 39 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1930) (contract held
to be a mere noninterest bearing account receivable).
"2 See Appleman, Current Developments in Oil and Gas Tax Law, Univ. of Tex.
Seventh Inst. on Current Tax Law Developments 136, 144-46 (1959). Although many
of these cases, decided on the basis of no fair market value, dealt with contracts in
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future payments has had a commercial market has the economic
benefit concept been applied." In addition, as pointed out by the
dissent, in determining just what evidences of obligation will be
considered as having a fair market value, the courts have usually
drawn the line at negotiable instruments. This is due to the fact that,
unlike executory promises to pay in the future, "a negotiable promis-
sory note is freely and easily negotiable chiefly because equities and
defenses available between the original parties thereto are not
available as against a third party purchaser for value, before ma-
turity and without notice.""s Although the court in this second
Cowden case placed great emphasis upon the fact that the taxpayer-
lessor refused to enter into a contract calling for an immediate cash
payment, this factor can only bear upon the solvency of the promisor
and upon the value of the rights received, and is wholly irrelevant
to the question of whether there existed a commercial market for
such rights."
The main difficulty with the Tax Court opinion stemmed from
the court's failure to specify whether the decision was based upon
a constructive receipt or an equivalent of cash theory. It seems
probable that the Tax Court did not recognize a distinction between
the two terms. If the Tax Court's underlying intent was to rely on
the constructive receipt concept, then it would have attempted to
tax the face value of the contract right, but if a decision based on
equivalent of cash concepts was intended, then the court probably
would have spoken in terms of the fair market value of the con-
tract right. Unfortunately, this potential clue leads to no solution
because the Tax Court's language is ambiguous, and the fair market
value of the contract right was held to equal its face value.
B. The Decision Of The Fifth Circuit7
The Fifth Circuit opinion did not distinguish between the con-
cepts of constructive receipt and equivalent of cash. It apparently
which the payment was contingent, e.g., Commissioner v. Garber, 50 F.2d 588 (9th Cir.
1931); Edward J. Hudson, 11 T.C. 1042 (1948), or with fact situations evidencing a
lack of market value, e.g., Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955); Estate of Clarence
W. Ennis, 23 T.C. 799 (1955), some involved solvent obligors unconditionally bound
to make payment, e.g., Commissioner v. Moore, 48 F.2d 526 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 620 (1931); Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941); Charles C. Ruprecht,
supra note 62.
4E.g., Paul Haimovitz, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 59 (1956).
65 32 T.C. at 861.
66 If the court really wanted to tax these rights under the economic benefit concept, a
preferable rationalization would have been to hold that the existence of a commercial
market is unnecessary if the promisor provides a "one-buyer market" by remaining willing
and able to pay cash after the execution of the deferred payment contract.
607289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
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took the view that the Tax Court's decision was based on a con-
structive receipt theory since the Circuit Court's opinion pointed
out that the Tax Court stressed the willingness and ability of the
lessee to make the bonus payments, and that the Tax Court "used
the amounts which it determined the taxpayers could have received
if they had made a different contract, rather than the fair market
value cash equivalent of the obligation for which the taxpayers had
bargained in the contracts which they had a lawful right to make.""8
The Fifth Circuit then clearly stated that the Tax Court could not
make an exception to the general proposition-that non-negotiable
executory contracts to make future payments in money do not have
a fair market value-by utilizing a constructive receipt theory, i.e.,
that the lessee was willing and able to make the bonus payments.
The most novel aspect of the Fifth Circuit's opinion was its
modification of the equivalent of cash doctrine. It first declared
that "as a general rule a tax avoidance motive is not to be considered
in determining the tax liability resulting from a transaction.""9 The
court then qualified this general statement by pointing out that,
although tax avoidance is allowable, "it is also true that if a con-
sideration for which one of the parties bargains is the equivalent
of cash it will be subjected to taxation to the extent of its fair
market value."' This brought the court to the contention of the
taxpayers that there could be no equivalent of cash obligation unless
a negotiable instrument was involved. This argument was based on
the fact that previous cases dealing with unsecured executory con-
tracts had made it clear that such contracts could be taxed only if
they had a fair market value and that they had a fair market value
only if they were negotiable. The court's answer to this contention
clearly modifies prior concepts as to the prerequisites for finding
fair market value. The court declared that whereas on the one hand
"a promissory note, negotiable in form, is not necessarily the equiva-
lent of cash," on the other hand, the converse should be applicable.
Thus the court concluded that:
if a promise to pay of a solvent obligor is unconditional and assign-
able, not subject to set-offs, and is of a kind that is frequently trans-
ferred to lenders or investors at a discount not substantially greater
than the generally prevailing premium for the use of money, such
e8ld. at 25.
'9 289 F.2d at 23: "[T]he taxpayers had the right to decline to enter into a mineral
lease of their lands except upon the condition that the lessee obligate itself for a bonus
payable in part in installments in future years, and the doing so would not, of itself,
subject the deferred payments to taxation during the year that the lease was made."
70 289 F.2d at 23.
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promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable in like manner as cash
would have been taxable had it been received by the taxpayer rather
than the obligation.7'
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court
and directed it to disregard the ability and willingness of the lessee
to pay and to determine the pure fact question whether the agree-
ments in question constituted the equivalent of cash. The effect of
this decision is that an unfunded contract to pay future benefits can
now have a fair market value (and thus constitute the equivalent
of cash) even though the contract itself is not negotiable.
In view of this holding, lessors in a similar position should arrange
for executory agreements to pay installment bonuses which lack the
various elements indicating the equivalent of cash because negotia-
bility is no longer the test of taxability. Instead, the determinative
factors will be based on substance rather than form. Therefore,
where, as in the instant case, the contract is considered to have a fair
market value by the parties, as well as by the business world, a
decision giving a fair market value to the contract may well be
justifiable. The apparent result is that the Bed-ell" doctrine can co-
exist with the economic benefit concept. Accordingly, although the
Bedell doctrine seemed to be a fundamental of income tax law, it
evidently must give way to the economic benefit concept when the
facts warrant."
Although the decision is undoubtedly based on the economic bene-
fit aspect of the equivalent of cash doctrine, a strong argument can
be made that this doctrine is inapplicable to a case such as this. Not
only is there a complete and unexplained break with prior judicial
precedent, but there is also a direct conflict with a 1960 Revenue
Ruling,"4 promulgated by the Revenue Service, which limits the
economic benefit concept to funded contracts."
A more serious ramification of the decision is that if, as in the
principal case, the court continues to speak the language of cash
equivalent where there is no established market, then all contract
rights should be held includible in income to the same extent as
under the accrual method. Accordingly, further judicial inroads
based on the reasoning in this case could eventually result in equat-
ing cash receipts with accrued receipts. This would have the effect
71 Id. at 24.
" Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929). See note 61 supra.
'a See 9 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 122, 127 (1960).
74Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 5.
'""A mere promise to pay, not represented by notes or secured in any way, is not




of penalizing those who use the cash method for its simplicity since
their gross income would probably exceed and could never be less
than under the accrual method, and there would be lacking the
corresponding advantage of being able to deduct accrued expenses. '
In addition, there would be an undue hardship imposed upon tax-
payers because they would be subjected to a tax before they received
the income upon which the tax is based."'
IV. CONCLUSION
There are three approaches which may be taken by the courts in
resolving the problem of the tax treatment to be given a sale of
rights (represented by unsecured, non-negotiable promises to pay)
to installment bonus payments. First, the entire installment bonus
technique can be destroyed by taking the position that in the tax
year during which the installment bonus arrangement is entered
into, the taxpayer-lessor will be taxed in an amount based on all of
the payments to be made. Second, each installment can be taxed
only in the year of receipt (assuming the necessary prerequisite is
met) ,", but if there is a sale of the right to the installment bonus
payments, it can be held that the taxpayer is simply anticipating
income and he can be taxed in that year at ordinary income tax
rates based on the proceeds received from the sale. Third, the ap-
proach that is taken in the second can be used except that the sale
of the right to the installment bonus payments can be taxed as the
sale of a capital asset and the proceeds taxed at capital gains rates.
It is submitted that the first and third approaches are unsatisfac-
tory. The first must be rationalized on the basis of either the con-
structive receipt doctrine or the economic benefit aspect of the
equivalent of cash doctrine and, as has been previously explained,
neither of these is logically applicable. The third, as has also been
shown, rests on the erroneous assumption that for federal income
tax purposes a leasing transaction in Texas constitutes a sale of an
interest in realty, and therefore, this approach is also without merit.
It is further submitted that the second approach is the only one
legally sufficient to cope with the problem. The installment bonus
arrangement itself should be approved because the constructive re-
ceipt and economic benefit theories cannot be resorted to for the
7"'Constructive payments" are almost never allowed as deductions under the cash
method. E.g., Vander Poel, Francis & Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 407 (1947) (cash
method corporation not allowed to deduct salaries authorized but not actually paid, even
though employees were required to report them as constructively received).
77 See Commissioner v. Garber, 50 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1931).
7 I.e., the installment bonus contract must not have a cash equivalent.
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reasons previously given."9 Therefore, assuming that the installment
bonus arrangement can be used with favorable tax results, the next
step is to ascertain whether capital gains treatment will be permitted
when there is a sale of the right to the deferred installment pay-
ments. Of the two techniques used to obtain capital gains treatment,
one, viz., that a lease brings about a sale of an interest in realty for
federal income tax purposes, has been shown to rest on an erroneous
premise. The other technique is probably likewise doomed to fail.
It is developed as follows."0 When a landowner-lessor executes an oil
and gas lease with a royalty reserved, he is considered not to have
parted with his capital investment in the oil and gas in place since
he has merely given another a share right in the production as con-
sideration for the assumption of burdens associated with the de-
velopment and operation of the lands by another. It thus follows
that the royalty is but a retained portion of the fee acquired at an
earlier date which possesses the same holding period. It is undisputed
that an undivided portion of the landowner's royalty may be sold
and that the proceeds therefrom will qualify for capital gains treat-
ment. Since for tax purposes bonus payments are considered to be
mere advance royalties, it is reasonable to conclude that if the land-
owner assigns his right to the deferred bonus payments for a cash
consideration, this assignment can be viewed as a sale of a portion
of his royalty thereby entitling him to capital gains treatment on
the cash consideration received.
However, recent judicial developments have dampened hopes for
the success of this technique. The well-known position of the Bureau
is that an assignment of a fraction of a royalty interest is treated
as a sale because the interest conveyed is co-extensive with the life
of the interest from which it is severed. But the interest conveyed
by the landowner-lessor would not be co-extensive with the interest
from which it was severed because the installment payments would
not run to the exhaustion of production as would the retained royalty
interest. Accordingly, this would be the basis for treating the as-
signment as analogous to the sale of a carved out oil payment "
which, under the doctrine of the P. G. Lake case," would cause the
entire proceeds from the sale to be taxed to the landowner-lessor in
"' For support for this position, see Fiske, Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Trans-
actions 5 2.06 (1960).
s See 2 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 219 (1953).
" See Fiske, Current Practices in Planning Oil and Gas Transactions, 8 Tulane Tax
Institute 367, 379 (1959).
" Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), held that where any oil
payment carved out of a larger economic interest is assigned, the assignor has anticipated
income and the consideration received is taxable as ordinary income subject to depletion.
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that year at ordinary income tax rates since it would merely amount
to an anticipation of income.
It is quite probable that future litigation will follow this line of
reasoning. Not only is this the most logical and legally supportable
course to pursue, but there is also a major policy factor83 involved-
a failure to apply the analogy of the Lake case (and the consequent
approval of capital gain treatment to proceeds received from the sale
of the right to future installment bonus payments) would lead to
a quick extinction of lump sum bonus payments since all bonuses
would be cast in the form of installments the rights to which would
be sold for capital gains.
Therefore, since this second and only other method for obtain-
ing capital gains treatment upon the sale of a right to bonus in-
stallment payments also appears destined for failure, the taxpayer-
lessor will probably have to be content with the use of only the first
step of this tax minimization technique, viz., he can arrange for
installment bonus payments represented by an unsecured promise
to pay, spread out the receipt of the bonus, and prevent a concen-
tration of income in one year if the executory contract can be
shown not to have a fair market value. On the other hand, if he
makes a sale of his right to the deferred payments, the proceeds will
be taxed in that year at ordinary income tax rates (rather than
capital gains rates) as constituting an anticipation of income. For,
once the principle of P. G. Lake is focused on this type of transaction,
surely the era of capital gains treatment must terminate abruptly.
83 See Oil and Gas Forum, N.Y.U. 12th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 433, 447 (1954).
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